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THE OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY
PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
CHARLES M. REHMUSI
WITH the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,1 com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, the nation was launched on a vast
experiment in governmental regulation of industrial relations. Certainly one
of the biggest and most vital experiments in the Act related to the national
emergency provisions.2 The nation put its reliance on fact-finding boards,
the injunction, and "cooling-off" periods as devices for stopping, or at least
delaying crippling national strikes.
Briefly, the sequence of events under the national emergency provisions is
as follows:
(1) When the President finds that a strike or impending work stoppage
threatens the national health and safety, he may appoint a board of inquiry
to make a written report to him containing the facts and circumstances of the
dispute. The report must not contain any recommendations.
(2) After receiving this report, the President may then direct the Attor-
ney General to petition an appropriate district court to enjoin the actual or
impending stoppage. The court may then grant an injunction of SO-days'
duration, during which time the parties shall make every effort to adjust and
settle their differences with the assistance of the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service. If settlement is reached at any time within this period, the
injunction is discharged.
(3) In the case of unsettled disputes, the President reconvenes the board
of inquiry which submits its final report by the sixtieth day of the 80-day
period, describing the parties' current positions, their efforts at settlement,
and the employer's last offer.
(4) Within the next fifteen days the National Labor Relations Board
takes a secret ballot of the employees to determine "whether they wish to
accept the final offer of settlement made by their employer." Within the re-
ainming five days of the 80-day period, the NLRB certifies the results of the
election to the Attorney General, who then requests and obtains a discharge
of the injunction from the court. The parties are then free to take any action
they see fit. At the same time the President is required to submit a full
]Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. All ideas e\pressed are
the author's, and may not necessarily be attributed to the Mediation Service.
1. 61 SrAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
2. 61 STAT. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (Supp. 1952).
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report of the proceedings to Congress together with any recommendations he
may choose to make.
This machinery has been invoked on ten occasions since the passage of the
Act on June 23, 1947. The first dispute in which the President intervened
involved the atomic energy installation at Oak Ridge. Subsequently, the
national emergency provisions have been applied to the meat-packing in-
dustry, telephone industry, maritime industry (on two occasions), bituminous
coal industry (on three occasions), non-ferrous metals industry, and a single
pipe-manufacturing plant in the steel fabricating industry.
Each of these cases represents a unique story with its own cast of characters
and its own distinctive plot.3 To develop a "complete story" for each of
these would require the reconstruction of a total situation. This task would
be impossible for anyone except for the "participant-observer," for only he
could reconstruct the inner circumstances of each dispute, its real flavor, and
the hidden attitudes and personality characteristics of the participants which
blocked or aided settlement. The author has had the opportunity of being
such a "participant-observer" in the most recent of these disputes-the strike
at the Dunkirk, New York, plant of the American Locomotive Company-
and, therefore, will make special observations only about this, in some ways
unique, application of the national emergency provisions.
At this time, after five and one-half years' experience with these pro-
visions, and with a new Congress considering their modification and amend-
ment, it seems appropriate to analyze their operation. The following analysis
is not made in the light of any particular new solution for the problem of
critical labor-management disputes. Rather it is an attempt to view critically
the experience with these provisions, using as a standard the criteria for suc-
cess established by Congress when the provisions were enacted.
It is difficult to ascertain any clear standards by which to gauge the success
or failure of the national emergency provisions. The congressional standard
was never made clear. Representative Hartley saw the emergency provisions
as a device for "stopping John L. Lewis" ;4 Senator Taft saw them as a method
of enforcing delay and encouraging settlement. 5 Perhaps the majority of Con-
gress wavered between the conviction and the hope that critical nationwide
strikes would be either discouraged, prevented, or stopped. Yet, in evaluating
experience under the Act in terms of effectiveness of the provisions, it makes
a substantial difference what standard of judgment is used. In so far as it is
possible to ascribe a congressional intent, it seems clear that the primary ob-
jective was to avoid stoppages. At the same time, Congress could not be
3. The most concise and accurate summary of the chronology of events in these dis-
putes, through the non-ferrous metals dispute of 1951, may be found in DEI'T or LABOR,
BUR. LABOR STATIsTIcs, NATIONAL EMERGENCY DIsPuTES UNDER THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS (TAFr-HARTI.EY) AcT Ser. 5, No. 2 (1952).
4. 93 CONG. REc. 3523 (1947).
5. 1 NLRB, LEsIsIATIvE HISTORY OF THE LMRA OF 1947, 421 (1948).
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accused of indifference to the terms of settlement or the fate of free collective
bargaining. Thus a second objective of these provisions can be determined:
a reasonable, viable industrial peace and the kind of federal intervention that
would promote mature bargaining or at least maintain existing free collective
bargaining.
In light of Congress' own objectives, this article will consider the appli-
cations of the national emergency provisions in terms of the following analysis:
(1) Have the provisions discouraged, prevented, stopped, or delayed big
strikes? (2) Have the provisions aided the collective bargaining process?
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONS IN STOPPING STRIKES
Whether breakdowns in negotiations and consequent work stoppages are
avoided by disputants in key industries simply because of dread of the plssible
appointment of a board of inquiry and subsequent entanglement in the pro-
cedures of the Act is a matter for speculation. Such speculation, however
entertaining, is futile because it cannot result in a definitive answer. The only
evidence on the question of whether the national emergency provisions have
prevented strikes lies in the record of the ten cases.
The bare figures show that strikes were involved in seven of the ten cases:
the meat-packing dispute, the pension dispute of 194S and the 1950 contract
dispute in the bituminous coal industry, both maritime disputes, the non-
ferrous metals and the American Locomotive disputes.
Dispuftes Without Strikes
Work stoppages were averted in connection with the other three cases:
the atomic energy dispute, the telephone dispute, and the 1948 contract dis-
pute in the bituminous coal industry. The record, viewed superficially, would
indicate that, in these three instances at least, the national emergency pro-
visions prevented a crippling strike." Such a judgment would be inadequate
because it entirely overlooks the special circumstances under which the settle-
ments occurred.
In the atomic energy dispute, it was not until after the machinery of the
Act was exhausted that settlement was achieved and then only ky arduuub
collective bargaining supported by determined mediation. In that dispute the
national emergency provisions undoubtedly secured a delay of the strike. It
is doubtful, however, that the fact-finding process contributed at all to a
settlement. William H. Davis, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Labor-
Management Relations Panel, testified before Congress on this point:
6. This t3pe of thinking was given an unfortunate impetus by the Joint Committee
on Labor-Management Relations, set up under § 401 of the Act to make a critical evalua-
tion of its operations. This Committee concluded that the Act might be cnsidered a suc-
cess since it appeared to have been successful in une or tw,.o cases. See REP. JoI: CW-111.
oN LABOR-MANAGESIENT RELATIONS, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
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"The controversy was just as acute when the injunction was dis-
charged as it was the day it was issued. Well, what was the result?
The men were free to strike. They had almost been authorized by
law to strike. But, in that case, the counsel of the American Federa-
tion of Labor certainly rose to the occasion. They recognized the
tremendous responsibility and importance of the atomic-energy pro-
gram, and they sent Brownlow down there and settled it without
a strike."
'7
If the atomic energy case proved anything, it proved that it is possible to (1)
delay a strike, (2) fail utterly in arriving at a settlement during the delay,
and, (3) leave the parties eighty days older but no wiser. Mediation and col-
lective bargaining rather than the Taft-Hartley Act seem to have generated
the settlement in that case.
In the telephone case the first step in the emergency process-the appoint-
ment of a board of inquiry-shocked the parties into a sudden enthusiasm for
free collective bargaining. The emergency procedure was abandoned soon
after it was initiated, and before the issuance of an injunction. The record
of the case clearly shows that as soon as the parties were confronted with the
existence of a board, and thereby the prospect of an injunction, they beat a
hasty retreat. Perhaps the board of inquiry contributed indirectly to a settle-
ment by providing the parties with what apparently was an unpleasant alter-
native. But surely the board served no other purpose in its short span of life.
Again the settlement was achieved by exclusive reliance on collective bargain-
ing.
Similarly, no injunction was issued in the bituminous coal contract dispute
in 1948. The board of inquiry turned its full energies to a kind of cramped
but determined mediation.8 The major overriding obstacle to settlement in
this dispute was uncertainty about a pending court decision. Once that de-
cision was handed down 9 the board of inquiry virtually abandoned its fact-
finding function and encouraged the parties to renew collective bargaining.
From then on, the path to settlement was clear and the board's only remaining
task was to write its report.
Thus, in none of the three cases in which a strike was averted can one say
with any real certainty (or even much plausibility) that the national emer-
gency machinery averted the stoppage.
Strike Cases
In disputes where work stoppages did occur, the record of the national
emergency provisions is still unsatisfactory, whether the purpose of the ma-
7. Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 891-2 (1949).
8. See p. 1057 infra.
9. Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948) (denying injunction against
the operation of the United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement Fund).
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chinery be strike prevention or strike delay. In the two maritime cases, while
the machinery delayed the strike for eighty days, serious strikes broke out
after the injunction was dissolved. In one of these maritime disputes, the end
of the national emergency machinery was followed by a three-month strike
involving 28,000 workers. In the other, the Atlantic coast maritime and dock-
workers' dispute, the dissolution of the injunction became the signal for a two-
week strike involving 45,000 workers. In the 1948 bituminous coal pension
dispute a work stoppage was in effect when the board of inquiry was created,
and the stoppage continued for a month thereafter. When the 80-day in-
junction was issued, union cooperation was slow and grudging. Finally the
union and its leader were fined for failing to comply with the terms of the
initial restraining order.'0 Even at this point full production was not reached
for some weeks. In the 1950 bituminous coal contract dispute the lessons the
union had learned in the pension dispute were put to good use: the injunction
was completely nullified. In this case the union's president, John L. Lewis,
ordered the striking miners to return to work following the issuance of the
injunction. The miners failed to comply either with the injunction or their
president's order. Once again contempt proceedings were initiated, but on
this occasion the union and its president were found not guilty on the ground
that the Government had failed to produce evidence sufficient to support
charges of either criminal or civil contempt."1
Only in the American Locomotive dispute did the machinery delay a strike
for the purpose of allowing settlement to be reached. This strike, at the Dun-
kirk, New York, plant of the American Locomotive Company, had continued
for three months until enjoined on December 12, 1952. The strike prevented
the manufacture of pipe and other items necessary for the completion and ex-
pansion of atomic energy facilities. Production was resumed after the injunc-
tion was granted, and a tentative basis for settlement was reached through
intense mediation just prior to the holding of the "final offer" ballot. The
national emergency machinery, however, did nothing to promote this settle-
ment.
Similarly, the remaining cases neither prove nor disprove the adequacy of
the machinery in stopping or delaying strikes. In the meat-packing case, the
President was poorly advised as to the criticalness of the controversy as evi-
denced by the fact that he made no attempt to obtain an injunction after re-
ceiving the report of the board of inquiry. In the non-ferrous metals dispute,
while the injunction did appear to prevent the continuance of the work stop-
page, the actual circumstances of the dispute reveal that an agreement between
the most important parties was reached the day before the board of inquiry
10. United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1943), aff'd,
177 F2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de ied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
11. United States v. United Mine Workers, S9 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1950), dis-
missed as vnoot, 190 F2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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met for the first time. Apparently, the work stoppage would have ended at
approximately the same time, with or without an injunction.
The lesson of the strike cases, particularly the two maritime and two coal
disputes, is quite evident. Most unions, unlike the United Mine Workers, are
not sufficiently cohesive and strong of purpose to be able to frustrate and
ignore an injunction.12 However, it is plain that nothing in the provisions
can "stop" a union or its leaders who are determined to strike after the in-
junction's dissolution. At best the injunction can only delay the strike. It is
doubtful whether there is much virtue in delay per se, as evidenced by the
fact that there has been only one settlement during the injunction's cooling-
off period.' 3 As Cyrus Ching, former Director of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, stated:
"[I]n... those cases . .. the injunction stopped the strike at the
time, or when it was threatened. However, . . . after the injunction
had expired we still had the same problems.' 14
This lack of success-unless a "national emergency" strike loses its emer-
gency nature simply by being delayed-is both disappointing and surprising.
It is disappointing in view of the high hopes and large promises made for the
national emergency provisions by its original advocates; surprising in view
of the high regard for the provisions still held by many of these same pro-
ponents.
This almost complete failure of the provisions to stop critical strikes can be
attributed to the provisions' effect on the collective bargaining process.
IMPACT OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Piocss
The national policy of favoring and promoting collective bargaining was
not altered by the Taft-Hartley Act. The stated intent of the Act indicates
that its sponsors sought to reinforce the collective bargaining process. Even
in regard to the national emergency provisions Congress had this as one of its
two objectives. The failure of the provisions to attain the first objective-
stopping critical strikes-can be attributed to a failure by the legislative
drafters to understand the nature of the collective bargaining process. The
following criticisms of the national emergency provisions, based upon ex-
perience with them, point inescapably to the general conclusion that they
neither aid collective bargaining nor create the conditions necessary for ami-
cable agreement between labor and management.
12. While it is true that John L. Lewis has been somewhat less than cooperative with
the national emergency machinery, it remains Lewis' contention that the nation has never
suffered from a shortage of soft coal during his tenure as President of the UMW, To
the surprise of many, this statement is difficult to disprove. See Bernstein & Lovell, Are
Coal Strikes National Einergenciesf, 6 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 352 (1953).
13. The American Locomotive dispute. See p. 1051 supra.
14. Hearings, mtpra note 7, at 63.
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Excessive Reliance on Govcrnment Intervention
The very existence of the national emergency provisions necessarily alters
the framework in which bargaining is conducted and results in excessive re-
liance on government intervention. The possibility that the emergency ma-
chinery may be put in motion has figured inevitably in the calculations, tactics,
and expectations of the parties. The board of inquiry in the West Coast mari-
time dispute reported:
"The possibility [of resort to the national emergency provisions]
has influenced negotiations. The appointment of the board of inquiry
has, of course, increased the possibility of an application for the issu-
ance of an injunction. Amd that has alleviated for the time being
the pressure for settlement which a threatened strike would other-
wise impose." 15
Bargaining in key industries has very frequently been done with an eye
peeled for the possibility of federal intervention. In concrete terms this means
that a party that feels that it has something to gain from an injunctioin
or a board of inquiry may devise its strategy in order to put pressure on the
President for resort to the national emergency provisions of the Act. Nlanage-
ment, of course, gains continued production and profits. But even unions.
professing to despise the labor injunction, will adopt this strategy in cir-
cumstances where they are secretly relieved to be ordered to refrain from
what they were, in fact, reluctant to do-take or continue strike action. This
may occur in two situations: either where the union leaders' public militancy
is not supported by an enthusiastic membership, as was suspected to be the
case in the telephone dispute; or where the union is anxious to avoid or stop
a strike in situations in which the charge of harming the national defense and
safety is difficult to ignore. This was particularly true in the atomic energ,
dispute.
Any approach to the problem of critical strikes must consider this strategy.
What the government is or is not expected to do has become one of the
fundamental factors conditioning the conduct of negotiators in the major in-
dustries. In some, federal intervention has been virtually assured if either of
the parties adopts the strategy of inducing the application of the emergency
provisions. The frequent adoption of this strategy will increase the number
of instances in which government intervention is necessary. And, perforce,
the goal of eliminating the need for government intervention is defeated.
The Dilennza of Timing
If strikes are to be averted or delayed by the national emergency provisions
it has become necessary for the President to initiate action some time in ad-
vance of the strike date. The practical effect of this has been to reduce the
15. BoARD OF INQuiRY CREATED BY Ex-C. OD R No. 9964, RXXorr TO TUE PREswzri
o.N; LAOR DisPums IN THE MARrm IN~usraY 13 (194S).
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pressure for settlement just at the stage when such pressures are mounting.
These circumstances place the mediation authorities at a significant disadvan-
tage. Mr. Ching, former Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, testified:
"We have found this: that in some of these large cases we had
to stop negotiations at a fairly critical period, an important period,
possibly two weeks before the deadline, in order that a board of in-
quiry could be set up under the law and report to the President.
Such a report had to be filed before the President could ask for an
injunction."' 6
Negotiations ordinarily stop when the Act is invoked because the parties must
shift their energy from the search for agreement to the more immediate task
of making a good presentation before the board of inquiry. Since the im-
pending injunction frees both parties from the threat of an immediate work
stoppage, there is no economic pressure to reach a settlement. Moreover,
early intervention is particularly unfortunate where, as in many industries,
it is traditional not to reach settlement until the eleventh hour. On the other
hand, if the Government encourages collective bargaining and assists the parties
until the last minute, the national emergency provisions cannot then be brought
into play in time to prevent a stoppage.
The problem of timing has been a serious one on several occasions when
the Act was used.'1 In the maritime dispute the President felt impelled to
prevent a strike rather than to end a strike at some unspecified date after it
had occurred. Accordingly, a board of inquiry was appointed twelve days
prior to the contract termination date. Normally, settlement could have been
expected to be reached during this period. However, in the non-ferrous
metals dispute, the President selected the other alternative and delayed
initiation of the Act's machinery. Consequently, two weeks' valuable produc-
tion was lost while the government went through the ritual preparatory to an
injunction.
Thus, in industries where continuous service or maximum production is
essential, the machinery of the Act poses a serious dilemma for the Govern-
ment. Although the initiation of federal intervention may occasionally frighten
a few parties into a renewal of fruitful collective bargaining, the usual pattern
is a shift from negotiations looking to possible agreement to a renewal of con-
tention at the most crucial and inopportune time. On the other hand, if the
Government does not resort to the national emergency provisions until the
stoppage is actually under way, it guarantees a senseless work stoppage for
at least a matter of days.
16. Hearings, mtpra note 7, at 62.
17. The problem, of course, does not exist in most production and manufacturing
industries because the existing stockpile of the product ensures a sufficient supply while
the machinery of the Act eventuates in the injunction. However, when the problem does
occur, as for example in communication, transportation, or in defense production indus-
tries, the dilemma is very real.
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Restrictions on Boards of Iuquiry
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 18 crippled the boards of in-
quiry with many restrictions. Among these are a necessity for haste and pro-
cedures which neglect the influence of public opinion. In addition, the Act
prohibits recommendations by the board of inquiry, in circumstances where
the best fruit of fact-finding would be a set of recommendations on which the
parties could agree. These restrictions have largely eliminated possible op-
portunities for the boards to aid and assist the collective bargaining process.
As a result, these boards have gradually taken on several new and interesting
functions.
The necessity for laste. One of the primary restrictions upon fact-find-
ing is the time factor. As someone remarked, "A board of inquiry is nothing
but a whistle-stop on the road to an injunction." On this road, speed is a
necessity, reflection a luxury. The executive orders creating boards of inquiry
have always specified the date on which the board's report was due.10 The
time is invariably too brief for competent research, conscientious analysis, and
sometimes even clear writing of the report. Time is limited because the report
of the board of inquiry is a necessary preliminary to the injunction. The
President, confronted with the alternative of interrupting the bargaining pro-
cess or allowing a strike to begin, has almost always appointed boards of in-
quiry at the last possible date and has at the same time asked that their reports
be given him in a very few days. The board in the East Coast maritime dis-
pute was asked to report in three days; the non-ferrous metals board in five.
Both the non-ferrous metals and the American Locomotive boards of inquiry
found it necessary to ask for an extension of time in order to complete their
findings.
An atmosphere of tension and haste pervades the boards' inquiries.- " The
entire proceeding has ordinarily been conducted in a mad rush to get in under
the, deadline. A series of twelve-hour days is hardly conducive to exhaustive
analysis or mature reflection.
Neglect of public opinion. The most fundamental assumption behind the use
of fact-finding procedures is that if the public knows the facts, then public
pressure will force a settlement. Yet public opinion can hardly become in-
18. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
19. E.g., on December 3, 1952, Executive Order 10417 established the American Lco-
motive board and stipulated that "The Board shall report ... on or before December 10,
1952." Exec. Order No. 10417, 17 FED. REG. 10931 (1952).
20. The American Locomotive board worked an average of slightly over 11 hours
a day for a seven-day period in preparing its initial report. This is not unusual under
these circumstances.
The one exception with which the author is familiar occurred in the meat-pacldng
dispute, where the board vas informally requested by the White House to delay as long
as possible in submitting its initial report in hope that the dispute would be settled before
resort to injunction. This board took 24 days to submit its report.
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formed, let alone effective, in the twenty-four or forty-eight hour period that
occurs between the issuance of the report and resort to the injunction.2" ' Resort
to injunction has not only effectively paralyzed the normal pressure for settle-
ment but has lessened public interest and reduced public pressure at the same
time. With a promise of eighty days of "peace," public interest has quickly
waned.
This lack of public interest has been equally obvious in the case of the
boards' final reports which are made at the end of the first sixty days of the
injunction period. During the life of the injunction, public interest in a dis-
pute fades. It is revived only with the prospect of some "break," either settle-
ment or stoppage. Therefore, in the flood of news stories accompanying major
national disputes, relatively little attention has been directed to the final re-
ports. In large part this is due to a paralyzing restriction on the creation of
public interest in these reports-the prohibition against the making of recom-
mendations.
Ban on recommendations. A statement of the facts of a national dispute by
a board of inquiry generally adds nothing new to public understanding. The
national wire services give rather extensive coverage to most critical disputes.
Hence the board reports, while they contain exhaustive statements of the
"position of the parties," have provided nothing new for the public beyond
a recapitulation of the basic essentials of the dispute-in short, no news at
all. If Congress sought to use the board reports to mobilize public opinion
behind the settlement of a controversy it failed in that attempt. What is news-
worthy is precisely what the Labor Management Relations Act forbids, i.e.,
a judgment of a board of inquiry respecting the merits of the case. Who is
wrong? How should the dispute be settled? These are the questions to which
the public might ordinarily look to an expert board for an answer.
Why did the Congress forbid the making of recommendations? The drafters
of the Act were quite clear in their conviction that boards of inquiry ought
not to make recommendations lest such recommendations take on the role of
arbitration awards. 22 They were properly concerned with the danger of un-
intentionally slipping into a system of compulsory arbitration. However, if a
dispute is in fact of "emergency" proportions then Government intervention
might be expected to do something more than recite the facts.2 3 In practice,
the general ban on the making of recommendations at any time and in any
21. Due to the extreme time pressure existent in the East Coast maritime, non-ferrous
metals and American Locomotive disputes, the President requested the Attorney General
to obtain an injunction before copies of the report were available for the press and public.
22. 1 NLRB, Lois.Avz HISTORY oF Tim LMRA or 1947, 407 (1948).
23. In his suggested amendments to the Act made in 1949, Senator Taft attempted
to give the boards power to make recommendations for a fair settlement. 95 CoNa. REC.
7796 (1949). His bill-S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)-passed the Senate but was
rejected by the House. Id. at 8717.
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situation has proved too inflexible if the work of the boards is to have mean-
ing and significance.
New functions of the boards of inquiry. Since it is not in the nature of
men to "put in their time," particularly in critical situations, boards of inquiry
have tended to adopt several new functions-functions for which they were
.not intended but which they have occasionally performed rather well.
The first of these has been to operate as ad hoc boards of mediation. If
boards could not recommend a fair settlement they could at least try to settle
the dispute during or immediately following their hearings. The board of in-
quiry in the 1948 bituminous coal contract dispute attempted exactly this with
a substantial degree of success. This example was followed in the non-ferrous
metals dispute, with less but still worthwhile success, and by the board of in-
quiry in the American Locomotive case, totally without success.2 4 Neverthe-
less, the experience of these cases would seem to indicate a need for granting
the board greater flexibility in accomplishing what is, after all, the central
purpose of the whole procedure, a peaceful settlement.
Another interesting function that has been undertaken by boards of inquiry
is the determination of the seriousness or criticalness of the disputes. In most
of these disputes the seriousness of the situation is evident and is a problem
of national concern. However, in the meat-packing dispute both parties came
before the board of inquiry contending that their labor dispute created no
crisis of national proportions. After considering this problem at substantial
length privately, and to a lesser extent in its report, that board of inquiry
concluded that the language of the statute prevented it from making any find-
ing as to the emergency nature of the situation.2  This precedent began to
weaken in the non-ferrous metals dispute where the board of inquiry spent as
much time in its initial report discussing the emergency nature of the strike
in that industry as it did on the positions of the parties.
24. From the point of view of a participant in the American Locomotive dispute, the
pervading feeling throughout this time was one of futility. ediation was attempted in
an effort to do something-anything--constructive toward settling the dispute. It was
obvious to all concerned that the dispute would eventually be settled on approximately
the terms at which it was finally settled. However, problems of face-saving after a year-
long negotiation and the technical position of the union in relation to the "national emer-
gency" provisions made it seem impossible to find a lever to move the parties from their
crystallized positions. A solution, with neither side gaining a total victory, was event-
ually found only when the pressures of an impending work stoppage again faced the
parties.
25. The language of the statute states that when, "in the opinion of the President
of the United States" a threatened or actual strike or lockout imperils the national health
or safety, "he may appoint a board of inquiry to investigate the issues involved in the
dispute." 61 STAT. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C § 176 (Supp. 1952). This language would seem
to indicate that the conclusion of the board of inquiry in the meat-packing dispute was
accurate within the meaning of the Act. However, the board's reservations as to the
emergency nature of the dispute were borne out by the fact that the President made no
attempt to obtain an injunction.
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The tendency to determine the "emergency nature" was even more evident
in the dispute at the American Locomotive Company's Dunkirk plant. In this
case the board of inquiry held its first hearing with the representatives of the
Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of the seriousness of the strike's
effect on the completion and expansion of facilities for the production of nu-
clear fission products. Following this, the board included within both its
initial and final reports statements from the Atomic Energy Commission on
the criticalness of the situation. A substantial portion of both of its reports
was devoted to this point. Thus, without seriously considering whether it was
a part of its function, the board assumed the task of supporting the President's
decision to intervene in the dispute. The board's findings on this point were
accepted as evidence by the federal courts when the Steelworkers' Union sub-
sequently litigated the constitutionality of the national emergency provisions
and their application to this dispute.
26
These new activities of the boards of inquiry-the first to operate as an
adjunct to the mediation process, and the second to attempt a determination
of the criticalness of the dispute-indicate that boards can make a substantial
contribution to the settlement of emergency disputes and, moreover, that their
functions should not be explicitly limited in the statute.
26. The union unsuccessfully resisted the temporary injunction in the district court.
United States v. American Locomotive Co., 109 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1952). The
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, 344 U.S. 915 (1953), and the union then pur-
sued its appeal in the Second Circuit. The union claimed that the Act was unconstitu-
tional since it required a district court to grant an injunction solely to help the executive
branch of the Government to settle a labor dispute. It contended that this provision placed
a non-judicial function upon the court because the injunction did not relate to a justi-
ciable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. The
union further argued that even if the national emergency provisions were constitutional
the Act had been improperly applied because the Dunkirk strike, involving one small
plant in the large steel fabricating industry, did not meet the requirements of the Act that
the strike or lockout "affect an entire industry or substantial part thereof. . . ." It was
argued that the legislative history of the Act showed clearly that Congress meant it to
apply only to strikes which were substantially industry-wide in scope and not to those
of a local character such as the Dunkirk dispute.
The day before the injunction expired the Second Circuit held the national emergency
provisions constitutional. United States v. United Steel Workers of America, 202 F.2d
132 (1953). The court ruled that the issuance of the injunction was a judicial function
comparable to an appellate court's review and enforcement of an order of the National
Labor Relations Board. Id. at 138. It felt that the prohibition of strikes and lockouts
under specific circumstances implied that such strikes and lockouts were an invasion of
public rights. Id. at 139.
The court of appeals found no merit in the union's claim that the Act was misapplied
in this dispute. The strike affected a substantial part of the atomic energy industry. The
court decided that the words of the Act ("affects an entire industry") were sufficient
basis from which to infer a congressional intent broad enough to include a minor strike
in one industry substantially affecting another. Id. at 137.
The union was unable to obtain further review of this decision as the case became
moot the following day.
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The Fallacy of "Cooling-Off"
"It is absurd at the outset to characterize a waiting period for strikes
as a cooling-off period. Employees whose demands are subject to
enforced delay are most likely to become warmer over the contro-
versy... . The unfair feature of cooling-off legislation lies in the
fact that the government thereby compels persons to work upon
terms and conditions of employment which not it, but a private em-
ployer has fixed and which the government has no legal right to
alter."
27
Compulsory "cooling-off," imposed by injunctions, has been at best mean-
ingless and at worst harmful in relation to the collective bargaining process.
The futility of the cooling-off philosophy ought to be apparent. Labor dis-
putes are seldom matters of frayed tempers that cool off with time. Nor are
the experienced negotiators who usually bargain for key industries normally
given to sudden and uncontrollable bursts of anger. The disputes involve basic
conflicts in which the positions of the parties are the product of calculated
strategy. A burst of anger would more often be a part of this strategy than
a reflection of a real animosity.
Not only has the cooling-off period failed to serve its avowed purpose, but
in at least one instance the union exploited this period to stimulate animosity
toward the employer and to cement strike plans. Harry Bridges, leader of
the West Coast longshoremen, proclaimed to the board of inquiry that he
would turn the cooling-off period into a "warming-up period," a period of
preparation of strike psychology and strike plans.28 In that dispute both parties
reported to the board that the injunction and the cooling-off period had largely
failed of their purpose.
The reaction of Mr. Bridges to the injunction-imposed cooling-off period
simply underscores the general reaction. Where an injunction has been ob-
tained, there has been little evidence of noticeable progress toward settlement.
The reason for this ought not to be obscure. The dread of a stoppage, with
the cost it implies for both parties, is the dominant factor in the pressure for
settlement of labor disputes. The effect of a "cooling-off" period is to smts-
pend pressure for settlement for that period, making collective bargaining ses-
sions largely hollow gestures 2 9 Government intervention ought to enhance
27. Testimony of Ludwig Teller, Hearings before the Senate Committee o1 Educa-
tion and Labor on S. 55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1947).
28. BomnD OF INQUIY CREATEn B EEc. OmER No. 9964, op. cit. spra note 15,
at 10.
29. This point is affirmed by experienced mediators.
"Parties unable to resolve the issues facing them before a deadline date,
when subject to an injunction order, tend to lose a sense of urgency and to
relax their efforts to reach a settlement. They wait for the next deadline
date (the date of the discharge of an injunction) to spur them to renewed
efforts. In most instances the efforts of the Service to encourage the parties
to bargain during the injunction period ... fall on deaf ears." 1 FED. MEDIA-
TION & CONCjLIA-ION SERv. Amx. RE'. 56 (1948).
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or supplement the pressures making for settlement. But the cooling-off periods
have simply served to produce a waiting period, a dead space in which pres-
sures for settlement are slight.
Whatever the dubious advantages of the cooling-off period, they have surely
been lost by using the injunction to enforce a cooling-off. Regardless of the
logic or the legal even-handedness with which an injunction is applied to the
parties, the injunction seems, in the eyes of labor, to be a device for strait-
jacketing labor. The memory of the labor movement is long; in the legend
and folklore of unions, "government by injunction" is a symbol of oppression.
"Injunction" is a word and an event which creates a deep emotional reaction
on the part of labor groups and hardly improves the atmosphere for negotia-
tions.
The presumed purpose of an injunction is to secure an additional period
of time for renewed efforts at settlement. Yet in most instances it is possible
to achieve the same objective simply by requesting a postponement of the
strike. Experience under the Railway Labor Act supports the view that a
delay in a work stoppage will almost always be agreed to by the parties with-
out the compulsion of an injunction. A Presidential request for extension of
the status quo for a fixed period would seem to be a more appropriate method
of gaining time. If this objective can be achieved without coercion, and with-
out increasing the hostility of one of the parties, surely this is desirable.?0
The "Final Offer" Election
The secret ballot on the "final offer" of the employer contributes nothing
to the settlement of a dispute and is a positive irritant. Yet the Act requires
that in every unsettled dispute the NLRB, between the sixtieth and seventy-
fifth day of the 80-day injunction period, shall poll the employees to ascertain
whether or not they wish to accept the employer's "final offer" for settlement.
This is patently absurd. Up to the point of the actual signing of the agree-
ment, no offer can be called final. It may be part of a larger package. It
may be a conditional or partial offer made in the expectation that many other
details can be jointly agreed upon. It may be a genuine attempt at settlement
or simply a bargaining gesture.
Experience with these elections has clearly demonstrated their waste and
futility. The employees have overwhelmingly rejected the offer in the four
cases where it has been presented to them under the Act.3 ' In one case, the
union leaders asked the membership to boycott the election, 2 and not one
30. The ultimate irony in the use of the injunction lies in the fact that it cannot be
completely depended upon to stop a determined union or angry men from striking. This
is an unmistakable lesson of the coal strike of 1949-1950.
31. Elections were held in the atomic energy, both maritime, and the non-ferrous
metals disputes. The voting ranged from 2-1 to 10-1 for rejection of the employer's filal
offer. Some idea of the expense involved may be gained from the fact that the NLRB
spent slightly over $8,000 to hold the non-ferrous metals election.
32. This case involved the West Coast ILWU. See 1 Fim. MEDIATION & CONCUILIA-
TION SRv. ANN. REP. 48 (1948).
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ballot was cast either for or against the employer's last offer. In the mari-
time dispute on the West Coast the employer's last offer constituted a wholly
new offer which had never been the subject of collective bargaining. In this
same dispute an election had to be held on ships at sea, which proved impos-
sible within the fifteen-day period, and where the secrecy and fairness of the
balloting was open to substantial doubt. foreover, the complexity of the issues
and the lack of explanation frequently makes it doubtful that the workers truly
understand the nature of the offer.
In the American Locomotive dispute the ineffectuality of the "final offer"
election can be seen clearly. On approximately the fifty-fifth day of the in-
junction, the employer refused to state a "final offer of settlement" at the
board's hearings on the ground that he had already reached a settlement vith
the union. The union denied that an agreement had been reached, stating that
the employer had made an offer to settle the dispute at all three plants of the
company (only one of which was under the jurisdiction of the board), but
which offer the union had rejected.
Two members of the board of inquiry, interpreting the words of the statute
-- "as stated by him"n--to mean that the employer must state his last offer
to be such, felt unable in these circumstances to report any "final offer." The
Chairman of the board, in a separate statement, felt that despite the fact that
the employer refused to characterize it as such, a final offer was in fact made.
The Chairman reported this last offer as the willingness to put into effect
the terms of the so-called settlement. The Chairman did not feel compelled
to analyze the utility of a last offer requiring acceptance at three plants, the
employees of only one of which were going to be allowed to ballot.
When this report of the board of inquiry was duly submitted to the Presi-
dent of the United States, the Company was apparently unwilling to be taken
at its word. On the sixtieth day, the Company reported that it was now will-
ing to make a "last offer," a wage increase substantially below that which it
had already stated it was willing to put into effect. Although the board re-
ported this offer to the President, it was of course unable to do so within the
statutory sixty-day period. This confusion of conflicting statements and offers
was finally "resolved" when the NLRB, at the suggestion of the Federal Con-
ciliation and M1ediation Service, postponed the ballot "indefinitely," i.e., per-
manently.
34
The American Locomotive experience illustrates the extent to which the
"final offer" provision is conceptually elusive. In the course of negotiations
33. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 179 (Supp. 1952).
34. This "solution" casts light upon the problem which a ballot presents mediators.
The Mediation Service did not want the ballot taken, because collective bargaining was
once again becoming fruitful in the dispute. The Service felt, from bitter eperience,
that if a date for a ballot were announced, the union leaders would immediately direct
their energy away from negotiations and toward the political struggle of amassing a
heavy negative vote in the election in order to justify their previous conduct of negotia-
tions.
19531 1061
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
many offers, firm or conditional, are made. What then should be the "final
offer" to be placed on the ballot? How long should the NLRB wait before
printing a ballot on which a realistic "final offer" may be placed? Should
the Board submit to the workers the final offer made by the employer, or the
last offer that was subjected to collective bargaining between the parties, or
any final offer at all if the employer refuses to admit that he has made one?
If the offer which is made at least twenty-one days in advance of termination
of the injunction does, in fact, represent the statement of a fixed and unchang-
ing position on the part of the employer, then a real barrier has been placed
in the way of mediation efforts that are supposed to continue during the re-
maining twenty days. On the other hand, a vote turning down the employer's
last offer places new obstacles and difficulties in the way of settlement. The
essence of mediation, and of collective bargaining as well, is that all conceiv-
able paths to settlement must be explored. This process involves continuous
altering and restating of position, to which the very concept of "final offer"
is repugnant.
The "final offer" provision contains a profound misunderstanding of the
relationship of unions to their membership and to the employer. The plain
implication of the provision is that unions do not represent the true wishes
of their membership, hence the employees are casting a secret ballot with
which to undermine the position of their leaders. The provision for the ballot
was placed in the Act despite the fact that almost all of the authorities on
labor relations agree that in a test of loyalty the worker will almost invariably
support his union rather than his employer.3 5 The "final offer" provision
could have significance only in the exceptional instances where the union
suffers severe internal dissension, and blocs within the union are able to pro-
duce a vote that aims at undermining the union leadership. In such instances
the leadership is as likely to be rejected for being too soft in its dealings with
the employer as it is for being too hard. 0 Thus, the retention of a "final offer"
ballot in procedures designed to settle, or allow the settlement of, critical
strikes can only negate the purpose of the procedures.
CONCLUSION
The problem of securing uninterrupted production and economic stability in
basic industries is very real and cannot be diminished simply by criticism of
the existing machinery for meeting the problem. Some procedure whereby a
work stoppage can be halted or delayed is occasionally essential. A provision
35. "[A strike vote is) a ritual affirmation of solidarity, a symbolic gesture to impress
the employer. To vote 'no' would be equivalent to a complete nullification of the union's
bargaining power, an act of total disarmament during a crisis in foreign relations ...
[A] strike vote is merely a vote of confidence in the leadership, taken at a time when
it can hardly be denied." Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE PoLic" 41 (1948).




for a board of inquiry can be useful in situations where the parties have not
genuinely bargained or have refused to make clear their demands or pro-
posals. However, since the primary purpose of any machinery is to assist
disputants in reaching a settlement, this procedure should be optionally avail-
able. Labor disputes are infinitely varied in nature. For this reason the pro-
cedures adopted to assist in the resolution of such disputes should be equally
flexible. The inflexibility of the existing national emergency procedures has
made enforced delay-the injunction-the core of the machinery.
The apparent theory of the Act is two-fold: (1) the injunction effectively
blocks a threatened strike or terminates an existing one; and (2) a compulsory
cooling-off period encourages settlement. Where a union has resolved to con-
tinue a stoppage, the injunction has been disregarded. Where one or the other
of the parties has decided not to bargain or reach a settlement, the 80-day
cooling-off period has been without effect. After all the elaborate requirements
of the Act have been met, it is still possible to be face-to-face with the initial
problem of reaching a settlement and assuring uninterrupted production.
As initially indicated, there is no attempt here to describe or evaluate the
immense number of suggested approaches to solving this problem. These
range from "doing nothing" because we had little trouble before we attempted
to legislate against trouble, to the extreme alternatives of compulsory arbitra-
tion or stringent limitations upon the size of bargaining units. In between are
numerous suggestions-various forms of arbitration, voluntary "cooling-off,"
intra-industry agreements, more mediation, seizure, show-cause hearings, and
combinations of these-each of which is deserving of consideration and study.
The current debate is encouraging, and should result, if the lesson of experi-
ence is appreciated, in improvements in the existing national emergency pro-
visions.
The purpose of this article has been to evaluate the working of our present
legislation and, indirectly, to re-emphasize one basic point. Our national labor
policy is one of favoring and encouraging the resolution of labor-management
disputes through free collective bargaining. Therefore, in handling disputes
in basic industries the Government must ensure that the collective bargaining
pressures that make for settlement are strengthened, not dissipated. To the
extent that the existing machinery has not done this, it has failed. Modifica-
tions and amendments in the Act that aid collective bargaining and the agree-
ment-making process will doubly succeed. They will protect the community
from harm resulting from labor-managenent strife. Simultaneously, they will
strengthen our democratic industrial society.
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